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SteVen Folmar WAke Forest UnIVersItY
identity politicS amonG dalitS in 
nepal
In challenging, “the popular belief that castes that are considered impure according to the Brah-
manical hierarchy, nevertheless participate willingly in their own degradation,” (Gupta 2004, 410, 
see also Moffat 1979) Gupta suggests that the social action in which Dalits engage is poorly under-
stood.   Similarly, in Nepal, Dalit issues remain in the nearly invisible undercurrent of contempo-
rary identity politics.  This paper examines micro-level identity politics as they relate to the Dalit 
jats, Kami, Sarki and Damai in Central and Western Nepal.  The paper attempts to fill in some of the 
uncharted area of local political action by depicting various strategies employed by Dalits to negoti-
ate local political landscapes.  Several dimensions of Dalit identity strategies are examined includ-
ing inter- and intra-jat processes, the politics of inclusion and exclusion and the politics of anonym-
ity.  Manipulation of caste identity includes strategies making use of origin stories and manipulating 
inter-caste boundaries.  Specific techniques involve alternately asserting and obscuring identity via 
collective actions of political organization and openly challenging caste structures to shifting use of 
last-name identification, assuming higher jat status, and using powerful social positions (e.g. faith 
healer) to override inter-jat restrictions and to lay claim to resources normally withheld from Dalits. 
introduCtion
  This paper examines the little-understood question of 
Dalit1 identity politics in Nepal.  A major controversy 
is whether Dalits have internalized their low status 
so much that they reinforce it through their behavior. 
A brief review of recent literature on Dalit status 
suggests that in India this issue is still unresolved 
and in Nepal it is barely of interest to scholars.  In an 
attempt to illuminate questions of Dalit social action 
at the local level, I flesh out dimensions of identity 
politics, including a set of actions I call the politics 
of anonymity (and related strategies), to attempt to 
further comprehend Dalit resistance to their social 
oppression.  Three still-open issues are salient:
· The degree to which Dalits are still subject to 
social and political oppression.
· The degree to which Dalits “participate willingly 
in their own degradation.” 
· The social and political strategies Dalits employ 
to deal with degradation.
SCholArly literAture on dAlitS2 
  The earliest ethnographies to include details of 
Dalit life in Nepal did not appear until more than 
two decades after Nepal was opened to the west and 
the ethnography of Nepal was flourishing.  Caplan 
(1972) and Borgstrom (1980) examined the effects 
of local politics on inter-caste relations with high 
castes and Hofer (1976) published an account of 
smithy among Kamis.  Not until the 1990s was there 
an expansion in ethnography specifically focused 
on Dalits. Much of this focused on specific ritual 
roles, such as shaman (Maskerinek 1995), Damai 
musicians (Tingey 1994) and Gaine  minstrels 
(Weisethaunet 1998).  Cameron’s (1998) examination 
of the status of women of several low-castes in far 
western Nepal is remarkable for its focus on daily 
routine.  I have recently contributed to literature on 
hill Dalits, examining how they are marginalized 
by higher status caste and ethnic groups in the 
processes of development and tourism (Folmar 
2004, 2005, 2008).   Parish (1996) examined caste 
structure and resistance to it among the Newars of 
Kathmandu Valley.  More recent interest comes from 
Nepali scholars whose foci are on the application of 
research to development concerns by Bhattachan, 
et al. (2002), Dahal, et al. (2002) and Kisan (2005), 
himself a Dalit.  This list of publications is quite short 
when compared to similar reviews for the high castes 
or for ethnic groups in Nepal.
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the challenge of working with dalits
  Research on Nepal’s Dalits has been sparse, partly because 
of the personal challenge of working among them. A similar 
difficulty is found in India, where scholars have demonstrated 
a very real, personal aversion to “the method,” as Moffat (1979) 
calls living among Dalits.  He noted that the prospect was so 
daunting that, after having set up residence in a Dalit village, 
he nearly forsook his research:
I was not at the time…prepared for the psychological stress of 
the method, and after about three months of intermittent resi-
dence in the Parangudi Harijan hamlet, I left the village and the 
region with the intention of abandoning my fieldwork in India 
(Moffat 1979: xxiv).
  Moffat eventually decided to live outside the Parangudi 
Harijan hamlet.  Even from a distance, he encountered 
problems of social stigma that interfered with his work.  The 
very idea that he wanted to understand the culture of Dalits 
was considered “outlandish,” by locals (xxviii).  The major 
obstacle was that contact with “untouchables” impeded access 
to people of clean castes.  Two and a half decades later Clark-
Deces (2005) would encounter similar difficulties in Tamil 
Nadu and in order to manage considerations of purity and 
impurity chose not to reside with the Dalits she studied.  
  Cameron, confronted by the same difficulty in her study of 
low caste women in far western Nepal, lived with a high caste 
family, reporting, “I had to make many concessions to continue 
with my research” (36).  She “had to obtain permission 
from [her] landlady before the low caste interviewee would 
be allowed inside [her] quarters,” (36).   Tingey (1994) too 
decided to forego the option of living in the home of a Damai 
musician, the group with whom she was working, in favor of 
staying with Newars, who were higher in status.  So unusual 
is it for ethnographers to live among Dalits that when my 
students and I stayed in Jharuwarasi, a low caste village in 
Kathmandu Valley, a television station found it worthy of 
doing a story on us for that very reason.
  Each ethnographer must consider the payoff when making 
such a choice.  As Dalits do live in a caste system, studies 
of their social standing must be conducted with reference 
to the other, higher status groups.   For Tingey (1994) and 
Cameron (1998) living among high castes restricted their 
access to the Dalits who were the central focus of the work. 
This was also a concern for me in Sirubari in 2002, when I 
attempted to understand the intricacies of Damai involvement 
in the local Gurung-run Village Tourism Project.  In an odd 
living arrangement of rotating among Gurung households 
every other day, I had to reach out to the Damai musicians 
by making twice daily trips to Damai Tol, a pattern that 
then restricted my access to important, high status Gurungs. 
Actually living among Dalits makes access to higher status 
individuals even trickier.  Living in Jharuwarasi among 
Dalits conferred automatic Dalit-like status to me and created 
situational ambiguities difficult to negotiate with elites, such 
as gaining entry to areas forbidden to Dalits, in particular tea 
shops.  As a consequence of having this status conferred on 
me (although in no way as onerous as actually being Dalit), 
I gained some insight into the social and psychological 
challenges their status entails.
dalits as non-issues in scholarship on nepal
  The study of Dalits of Nepal has also been secondary to 
other scholarly concerns.  One approach, which will be 
mentioned only briefly here, is to consider Dalit issues in 
Nepal as contributing little to what we can learn through the 
robust interest in Dalits of India3.  Another is to view Dalits’ 
concerns as secondary to current issues of global interest to 
the academic community or to emergent socio-political events 
in modern Nepal; in contrast, Dalit issues are seen as chronic 
and perhaps uninteresting.  
  As political and social events of the last decade of the 20th 
century unfolded, Dalit social issues remained mired in an 
ethnographic no-man’s land.  This was true even though the 
social problems that suddenly gripped scholarly attention 
had characterized Dalits for ages.  An upsurge of interest in 
women’s issues mirrored a global urgency to address feminist 
issues.  During the same timeframe, another global concern 
was to quell the spread of HIV/AIDS, leading to plentiful 
funding and scholarly activity.  The Maoist uprising provided 
a compelling, local, social phenomenon for academic 
attention. There is no argument about how important these 
and other issues are and, ironically, Dalit status was related 
to all of these.  In gender issues, Dalit women are recognized 
as doubly disadvantaged both by low caste and gender status. 
Dalits are suggested targets of HIV intervention because of 
their high risk profile.  Maoist rhetoric referred to issues of 
poverty, powerlessness and marginalization, all concerns 
for Dalits, who were said to have swelled the Maoists ranks, 
although there is no firm evidence to confirm that.  Even so, 
Dalit issues continued to be swept aside by these more current 
affairs – they had the one thing that Dalit issues lacked, the 
appeal that comes with the new discovery.  Dalit issues are 
just the opposite; they are age-old, rooted, some argue, in the 
very genesis of the caste system, and identified as a concern 
of Indian, rather than Nepali scholarship.
dalits and caste: resistance or acquiescence?   
  Scholars agree that castes are hierarchical, but dispute 
whether ranking is based in the symbolic separation of clean 
from unclean (Dumont 1970) or in the exertion of economic, 
political or materially-based power (Hocart 1950, Quigley 
1993).  Gupta (2005) recently raised the question of whether 
caste is more about identity than system.  He asserts that 
the caste system has remained fundamentally the same but 
that avenues for resisting and challenging it have opened up, 
making it more an issue of identity.  Beteille (1965) cautions 
us not to overlook other hierarchies, such as class, that 
operate alongside caste and can either work in tandem with 
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caste or cut across it, thus weakening it.   A focus on Dalits 
begs yet another question about whether caste is a unified 
system or is composed of several micro-systems of ideology 
and social practice (Moffat 1979).  No one definition suffices 
for caste, since it describes a wide range of cultural situations 
across time and space.  The caste system has such social 
potency and ability to resist change (though change does 
occur) because it is all these things, symbolic and material, 
one system and several, overlapping other hierarchies such 
as class, race (Hangen 2005), gender (Cameron 1998) and 
even modernization (Bista 1990).  Beteille notes that until 
recently caste was a system of cumulative inequalities:  in 
“the traditional structure the cleavages of caste, class, and 
power  tended much more than today to run along the same 
grooves” (1965: 4).  In reinforcing each other, they were far 
more difficult to resist.
  This view of “traditional” systems of caste has led scholars 
to accept the marginalization of Dalits uncritically. According 
to Karanth, by stressing “institutional similarities among the 
Untouchable castes and the so-called ‘higher’ castes scholars 
like Dumont and Moffat attribute a passive acceptance of 
low status by the former” (2004: 138).  The view that Dalits 
thus reinforce their low status is consistent with self-identity 
theory, which posits that in any hierarchical social system, 
“low ranking people often feel they have a stake in the 
hierarchy…a lowly position and a strong sense of duty are 
neither incompatible nor contradictory” (Hatch 1989: 351). 
But the pivotal moment in Dalit history in Nepal was the 
imposition of untouchability, pani nachalne, onto low castes, 
as defined by the Rana rulers in the Muluki Ain of 1854 (Hofer 
1979).   According to Kisan (2005), an organized Dalit social 
movement began at least 60 years ago, in 1947, to oppose 
their degradation.  
  Gupta has recently reviewed this issue for Indian Dalits 
(2005) and edited a volume exploring how they relate to people 
of higher caste (2004).  In these pieces, he and his colleagues 
challenge Moffat’s (1979) thesis that untouchables accept 
their low status and act in ways to reinforce it.  A process that 
is said to exemplify internalization of self-degrading behavior 
is Sanskritization, wherein low castes replicate practices of 
higher castes. But this is a matter of interpretation.  It could 
also be argued that copying the behavior of elites is a way 
to elevate status.  The biography of Dr. Ambedkar, whose 
emulation of high caste behavior initiated the entire Dalit 
social movement in South Asia would attest to that (see 
Jaffrelot 2004).  By the same token, the meaning of other so-
called self-degrading acts can cut both ways.  For instance, 
one can construe passive resistance of the kind described 
by Parish (1996) as self-debasing or as a subtle exercise of 
subversive power.  
  In a recent study of low-caste musicians in Tamil Nadu, 
Clark-Deces (2005) shows how behavior both accepts and 
resists low status.  Dalits in Tamil Nadu tell the story of 
Virajampuhan, the first Paraiyar, at the cremation grounds. 
The telling “is neither cathartic nor elevating, as is the case 
(at least partly) in dirges and death songs, but restrictive and 
downgrading” (Clark-Deces 2005; 131).  She goes on:
To the question of how they felt about their lowly condition…
men replied that they were not angry, because the great god Siva 
had fated them to be Paraiyars.  As one petitioner told me, ‘God 
created me in this caste.  I have no resentment (kurai) about 
that.  Who I am today is god’s creation and design (Clarke-
Deces 2005; 132).
  The dirges, however, are densely multivocal; they praise 
patrons (104), “secure esteem” for the singer (105), provide 
an arena for competition among singers (106-107) and teach 
lessons (115).  They are tragic and comic (115) and, in fact, 
are so irreverent that by singing them, men strive to, “tip the 
hierarchical world of the Tamil day-to-day life in their favor, 
even if their caste is low” (121).
  This theme, of the subversive masked by subservience, 
continues one established by Freeman in the landmark 
personal history of the untouchable, Muli (Freeman 1979). 
Muli frequently contributed to his own misery, not because 
he willed it, but because of structural barriers to his 
advancement.  Following on Berreman’s assertion that, “no 
group of people is content to be low in a caste hierarchy” 
(1973, 405), Freeman explains: “Mulmi and other Bauris 
have failed, not because they embody expectations of failure 
or accept their lot, but rather because the Bauris face social 
and economic disabilities that they are presently powerless to 
change” (1979: 397).
  The same is true of Viramma (2002), a Dalit woman who 
describes how she and other Dalits silently accept restrictions 
on their singing by high caste patrons: “When we work for 
the Reddiar, there’s no question of us singing.  We keep our 
mouths shut out of respect for the Reddiar” (2002: 191). 
But:  
Towards midday, as soon as the Reddiar goes home to eat, I 
start up with the first song.  After our husbands, the Reddiar 
are the people we respect and fear the most.  We are their serfs.  
It’s different with other landowners, we sing as much as we 
want and anyway, they like it.  Sometimes when we work for 
the Naicker, we joke with him.  We can even make fun of him 
(2002, 191).
The relationship between structural control and latitude for 
open resistance becomes clearer in her remarks that, “We 
make fun of Brahmins as well” because “Brahmins own 
nothing…apart from Temple land.  We never go work for 
them, they employ only Kundiyanar.  That’s why we can 
make fun of them” (2002: 192).
Social and political strategies
  The social and political strategies Dalits employ in everyday 
life to bow to, quietly accept, dissent to or resist high caste 
domination are numerous.  At times a single action embodies 
several goals, even polar opposites, behaviors that seemingly 
accept the system but subtly challenge it.
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  A primary form of dissent, according to Karanth (2004) 
is replication, which has been viewed by others, including 
Ambedkar (Jaffelot 2004), as acquiescing to low status. 
However, Karanth argues that it is the economic system of 
patronage in village Karnataka that maintains economic and 
ritual hierarchy, not the act of replication.  Empirically, this 
point is played out at the town well, the use of which is a point 
of contention between untouchable Holeyas and landowning 
Okkaligas.  One Holeya says, “After all, my people live here 
and I do not want to antagonize the members of other castes. 
But I am hopeful that the Okkaligas will realize that the old 
order is changing and will stop treating us the way they are 
doing now” (Karanth 2004: 156).  But Karanth comments that 
the dominant prevail: “if [the Holeyas] oppose the ideas of 
segregation as prescribed by the dominant and ruling faction, 
they are not likely to get what they want,” (2004, 158).
  Moffat (1979) sees replication quite in the opposite way of 
reinforcing low status.  By thoroughly copying the institutions 
that Brahmins bar them from, Dalits further marginalize 
themselves from the system in which they seek membership. 
This view depends heavily on Moffat’s assumption that 
Dalits and Brahmins share one cultural system (Gellner 
2001).  Karanth (2004) disagrees; replication is not a form of 
acquiescence to a low status position in a seamless social ethic, 
but is a strategy of dissent.  People who perform service can 
disagree with the system, but may have little power to resist 
it.  Regardless of caste, village headmen and elders vigorously 
uphold a social system that serves their own needs.  Cameron 
(1995) concludes similarly, showing how Dalits select Bahuns 
to perform their rituals – through married women’s natal 
male relatives.   Although this might appear to be replication, 
it is in fact only so in that Dalits get the ritual work done; 
otherwise, they sidestep caste Bahun authority.
  In my experience, Dalit views of self depart significantly 
from how high castes view them.  Although the Bahun may 
recoil at the mere thought of taking food from a Dalit’s hand, 
the Dalit is not reluctant to make such an offer, for he does not 
think he is dirty or achut, but recognizes that others see him 
this way.  The offer is not one merely of food but as a chance 
to negate notions of impurity. 
  Because of acts like this, Dalits are often described as 
anti-establishment, in that they resist Hindu hegemony by 
turning to deities that reign beyond the central moral order, 
and drawing power from sources that defile the high castes 
(Kinsley 1993).  One particularly powerful and potentially 
subversive Goddess is Kali.  The subversive elements “of Kali 
worship have long been at the core of the religious practices 
and world views of aboriginal, Tantric, low caste, and village 
traditions,” (Caldwell 2003).  Devotion to Kali is widespread 
among low castes, precisely because of her subversive nature, 
her destructive capabilities and her potential to transform 
society.  Kathmandu Valley contains the holy shrine of 
Dakshinkali, where the masses sacrifice to her and which 
validate certain local forms of shamanism and faith-healing, 
ritual positions of power open to Dalits. Shamanism and 
faith-healing are conducted as such and are examples of Dalit 
attempts to wrest power for themselves though innovative 
practices of resistance to an unmerciful social order (see, e.g. 
Maskerinec 1995).   
  Another way to resist caste hierarchy is to reconfigure Vedic-
based origin stories into jati puranas (Gupta 2005), which 
posit an origin of caste equality.  The latter openly question 
Brahmanical claims to high status and challenge the validity 
of hierarchy.  Alternate origin stories are not uncommon. 
Badri (2004) recounts, for example, how Dalits create stories 
that realign present day claims to status through valorizing 
the past.  A case in point, the story of Uman Devi honors 
Dalits’ place in history and legitimizes their present.  Even 
Moffat (1979) records the story of Aadi Draavida, the 
primordial Dravidian, claiming the position of the first born 
of caste ancestors.  In a similar vein, Dalits, reject Hinduism 
outright in favor of other religions favoring equality, such as 
Buddhism, sometimes believed to be the original religion of 
Dalits (Jaffrelot 2004).  
  In another cultural domain, Agrawal (2004) describes how 
caste can be reordered through the manipulation of kinship 
rules.  These rules are designed for central moral codes, not 
codes of prostitution, the caste-based occupation of Bedia 
women.  Through artful twists of caste logic, Bedia claim high 
jat status for their offspring sired by high caste men.  In quite 
a different manner, Quigley (1993) and Gray (1995) touch 
briefly on how naming and manipulation of kinship identity 
are employed both as a means of assigning and resisting caste 
identity in Nepal, a topic that is explored below.  
  Another area of resistance is physical space, made exclusive 
by constructing symbolic and physical boundaries to exclude 
low-status individuals from high status areas.  Beteille (1965) 
shows how the physical structure of the village in South 
India mirrors its power structure: “the agraham … is not 
only a cluster of habitations, but also the centre of social 
life for the Brahmins,” whereas, “the Pallacheri…is not just 
another quarter of the village; it is a place which no Brahmin 
should enter.”  I have also observed how higher status groups 
manipulate geography to exclude Dalits (Folmar 2008) and 
by so doing, create spaces that Dalits control because of their 
potential to pollute the pure.  Low castes control their space 
by a sort of proxy power relinquished to them by people who 
want to avoid its capacity to pollute.  Ironically, that which 
defines Dalits as low and powerless imbues them with the 
subversive power of untouchability.  A Brahmin who enters 
Pallacheri risks becoming defiled and hence barred entry to 
Brahmin-only spaces.
   Three features of cultural geography, tea shops, water taps 
and temples are the focus of changing inter-caste relations 
in Nepal today (see Kisan 2005) and figure significantly in 
current identity politics.  
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dalit oppression 
  There is no simple answer to the question of whether Dalits 
are achieving social equality in Nepal today.  The current 
legal code prohibits caste discrimination, but, as Kisan 
(2005) points out, they are not enforced and have loopholes 
that allow for continued oppression on numerous grounds. 
Often the conversation centers on whether a specific change 
signals deeper, more fundamental shifts in the social fabric of 
Nepal.  Speculation falls into three categories: that material 
improvement is possible despite caste affiliation, that Dalits 
now have access to occupations they once did not, and that 
restrictions on specific prohibitions are easing.  All these are 
true; I have seen examples of each, but it is just as easy to 
conclude that very little is changing and to employ the same 
examples as evidence.  
  These discussions point to the complexity of what constitutes 
real change.  Toppling  the caste hierarchy into a set of distinct 
but socially equal identity groups is not expected by anyone. 
Nearly three decades ago, Kolenda concluded that for Dalits 
of India hierarchy was not vanishing; “untouchables are 
not advancing as rapidly as the legislated quotas originally 
forecasted” (1978: 132).   If anything, in Nepal, change for 
Dalits lags behind India.  Nepal’s Dalits lack the political 
force to instigate meaningful change and for many Nepalis, 
the goals are less grand, formulated as a desire to loosen the 
system up for individual- and group-level social mobility. 
Ideas that have traction focus on tangibles, like educational 
and occupational opportunities.  Key symbolic changes in 
oppression, such as access to once-forbidden cultural spaces, 
in particular temples, tea shops and wells, working in jobs 
once unattainable and side by side with non-Dalit colleagues 
without fear of discrimination are debated.  They are argued 
over both as evidence for positive social change and as 
examples of superficial changes that obscure the fact that 
things are changing very little.  This theme, that evidence is 
ambiguous, pervades my observations from working among 
Dalits in Nepal.  
dAlit identity in nepAl: deSCriminAtion 
And eQuAlity4
  I now summarize ethnographic observations I have made 
on issues of Dalit agency, or their culturally constrained 
ability to act (Ahearn 2001).  For Dalits, agency is referenced 
specifically in relation to people of higher and dominant 
status, including castes and ethnic groups.  It also refers to a 
particular kind of socio-political action that is akin to identity 
politics, within which sphere I will discuss the multiple ways 
identity is illuminated and claimed as well as how it is altered 
and even masked, and how each action is employed as a 
strategy to regulate relations with others.  I call the altering 
and masking of identity, the politics of anonymity.  Its overt, 
tactical structure is opposite to identity politics, and the two 
can work at cross-purposes, that is, masking identity can 
be viewed as thwarting the goal of asserting rights through 
identity. I specifically address two interrelated topics.  One is 
how Dalits conceptualize their status as Dalit and the other is 
how they manage their behavior toward other jats, especially 
those higher in the social order.  First though, I set the stage 
by briefly assessing the broader socio-political climate in 
which Dalits struggle to acquire an “equal” standing among 
other groups in the caste system.
Caste and equality in nepal
  Eliminating social and political barriers to low castes (and 
others, such as women, janajati, etc.), is one of the salient 
issues of the day.  In today’s activist social climate attaining 
equality is frequently discussed.  Nepal has been highly 
politicized for as long as I have worked there, beginning in 
1979.  Even then, in urbanizing Pokhara, Dalits of Damai Tol 
voiced an intense dissatisfaction with their low standing at 
the time of the Referendum of 1980 on the multiparty status 
of the government.  One interview I had with a Damai man 
in his 30s particularly stands out.  Although my project only 
dealt peripherally with inter-caste relations, it was prominent 
in his mind.  His comments centered on the injustice in the 
many restrictions heaped upon low caste people.  He peppered 
his remarks with reference to the equality (barabar) he felt 
was inherent in all people, essentialized by the sharing of one 
blood.   “Mero ragat chha.  Bahunko ragat pani chha.  Mero haat 
khatera ragat auncha.  Bahunko haat khatera, ragat pani auncha.” 
(I have blood.  A Brahmin also has blood.  When my arm is 
cut, I bleed.  When a Brahmin’s arm is cut, he also bleeds).
  In the nearly three intervening decades, the Dalit cause has 
been taken up on official and informal fronts.  The Government 
of Nepal includes the improvement of Dalit social, economic, 
educational and political status in its Tenth Five-Year Plan, in 
which social justice for Dalits is officially designated as a goal 
deserving of an entire chapter:  
All around development is possible only if multi-ethnic groups, 
multi-lingual and various groups and communities within the 
country develop in proportionate manner.  Such type of de-
velopment will help to utilize their inherent skill, ability and 
knowledge in the national development process on the one 
hand, and on the other, assist to uplift the living standard of 
the Dalits, neglected, downtrodden and oppressed classes by 
creating employment opportunities through the mobilization of 
local resources (Government of Nepal 2002, 28:1).
  Although the plan does not precisely define Dalit, the 
government has established a National Dalit Commission 
to protect Dalit rights that were granted legally in 1963. 
The plan advocates a joint effort to offer social justice to 
Dalits via a strategic goal urging, “the government, NGOs, 
and private sector, to put an end to caste discrimination by 
identifying discriminator situation against dalit community 
(sic)” (Government of Nepal 2002, 28:3).  Efforts to identify 
the specifics of discrimination against Dalits have been made, 
notably by Dahal, et al. (2002) and Bhattachan et al. (2003) 
who show that it remains pronounced and includes over 200 
specific ways of discriminating against Dalits.
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Changes in Status
  Although this paper is about social and political status it is 
important to comment briefly on economic status.  Dalits are 
among the poorest groups in Nepal.  The Dalits with whom I 
have worked mostly fall into that category and their poverty 
is quite visible.  Many rural and semi-urban Dalits are either 
landless or have too little land to support themselves.  Houses 
tend to be small and of one storey, constructed from earth and 
stone even in areas where higher castes are quickly modifying 
or building houses with modern materials.   In Sirubari, where 
many Damai are unemployed, households piece together a 
family economy from numerous jobs.  The same can be said 
of Damai and Sarki living in Jharuwarasi.  Although in these 
locations some people prospered more than others, I have 
visited other areas in which entire neighborhoods are quite 
poor.
  Economic change is visible for Dalits, though it is not simple 
to assess; it entails a plethora of variables among which both 
economic improvement in some cases and decline in others 
can be seen.  One of the most poverty-stricken places I know 
is the tiny neighborhood of mixed low caste in Ghandruk, 
called Naichitol.  In 2003, the people I met lacked jobs, 
food, adequate housing and health, and kept children home 
from school because they lacked the paltry amount of cash 
needed for supplies.  Although I only glimpsed it in 2007, 
the neighborhood was visibly improved.  The dirt courtyards 
had been paved with slate and the staircase up to the main 
thoroughfare had been improved.  Unfortunately, however, 
visible improvement often hides the cases in which people 
have been driven further into poverty as I discovered in 
Sirubari in 2002 (Folmar 2005).  The unpaved road to the 
village was extended there at the expense of a number of Dalits 
for the meager landholdings of several families lay entirely in 
the path of the road.  In the absence of their husbands, wives 
were pressured to sign land away without understanding what 
they were doing.  In the same village, however, electricity was 
extended to the Dalit houses that could afford it.  One man 
acquired a television while I lived there.
  Changes in economics similarly have mixed effects on social 
status, as illustrated by Ravi, a Dalit man who drove a car 
in a government car pool, a job he would have been denied 
until recently.  He asserted that he was treated as equal to all 
the other drivers even though he was the only Dalit in the 
pool.  It later became clear, however, that he obscured his 
identity from the other Nepali drivers by maintaining social 
distance from them.  That he masked his identity, rather than 
asserting it, calls for a different interpretation of how caste 
relations have changed and to what degree Ravi’s situation is 
evidence of change.  The question that puzzles us is whether 
Ravi improved his status by using the tactic of anonymity or 
did he compromise the quest for equal status by failing to 
identify himself as Dalit.  
  Ravi’s tactic also raises the issue of how ready high castes 
are to extend to Dalits access to once-privileged positions 
and places.  Hari, a high caste associate, has debated this 
point with me, positing that it is Dalits’ reticence that 
bars their entry to shrines now legally accessible to them. 
This reticence is something in the minds of Dalits, an 
internalization of their low status.  Hari admits that there is 
the “one side” of whether the high caste person will allow 
Dalits access, but more relevant is this “other side:” whether 
the Dalit can overcome the embodied low status and exert 
his right to enter.  Many high caste people and janajatis claim 
that they do not discriminate, but when confronted with the 
opportunity to grant equal treatment to Dalits, they do not 
transgress established boundaries and opt rather to maintain 
them.  Hari affords us two further instances of this reluctance. 
When in Ghandruk in West Nepal, Hari had spoken several 
times of his desire to move beyond inter-caste restrictions, 
which he felt were wrong on moral grounds.  However, when 
a Dalit offered him cooked potatoes, he visibly balked.  After 
some hesitation, to his credit, he acted in concert with his 
principles and took the food.  He later confessed to me that 
this was a psychological hurdle, but that he was motivated to 
overcome it because of his association with me.   
  A parallel example is offered from the village of Jharuwarasi 
from 2007, among Sarkis, who talk often of strategies to 
improve their caste positioning.  People readily pointed out 
that the situation had improved since my first stay there 
in 2005.  One Bahun was singled out as exemplary of how 
high caste people now accept Dalits and interact with them 
as equals.  This man, Acharya, had a janajati wife and lived 
near Sarkigaon.  Sarkis claimed that they and Acharya freely 
entered each others’ houses and during holidays could share 
meat, showing that sanctions on food sharing were easing. 
These changes are important, but in this case, they did not 
signal an abandonment of restrictions in caste regulations. 
In Acharya’s presence, Sarkis took the passive role in 
communication, except for one man, KB, whose story will 
be outlined later.  Moreover, all the Sarkis present, even KB, 
addressed Acharya with the English honorific, “Sir.”  On 
several occasions, KB also confided that he did not agree 
that Acharya fully accepted Sarkis as equal.  Nor did he 
completely trust Acharya.  Later, KB admonished me not to 
stay long when I visited Acharya’s house, not saying why, but 
conveying distrust in his whisper.
  Another case of the disjunction between public discourse 
of equality and asymmetrical social relations was visible in 
the words and actions of politically active young Dalits of 
Jharuwarasi.  One such person is Arjun a strapping young 
man who works in the Middle East most of each year.  He 
noted that social oppression was easing as Dalits improved 
their economic status, became Christian and obtained 
education.  All these changes weakened the power of caste 
and diminished the need to identify oneself as Dalit.  The 
logic that followed was that if one was not Dalit, then one 
could behave as non-Dalit in tea shops where the low status of 
Dalits was indexed by Dalits being barred entry and by their 
being requested to wash the glass from which they drank. 
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With some bravado, Arjun and other assertive Dalits claimed 
that they can now enter tea shops and refuse to wash their 
glasses.  In order to verify their claims, my colleague tested 
the issue by asking people to visit tea shops with him, but 
even the most vocal often refused to do so (Perry 2008).
  In Jharuwarasi in 2007, women could attend classes in 
social mobility offered six nights per week by the Federation 
for Dalit Women, which is funded by the Communist Party. 
At one such meeting a leader recommended that rather than 
wash glasses they had used Dalits should break, then pay for 
them.  Attendees have, again, not translated this strategy into 
action.  Reluctance to do so is tied up in the uncertainty of 
the outcomes as told of in stories of Dalits being punished 
severely for opposing caste restrictions.
dAlit modelS oF identity And identity 
politiCS
local model
  Every new venture – and especially one that challenges age-
old social norms –  has risk attached to it.  Twice Rajiv pointed 
out to me that “everything is experiment.”  The first time was 
when we spoke about his experiences with starting a business 
in the city.  Just before I left the field in 2005, he had sold his 
tea shop to his uncle, KB, using the profit to open a lunch 
counter at a school in Patan, where he was assured that the 
hundreds of children would eat daily.  By 2007, the business 
failed.  There were far fewer students than had been estimated 
and most of them carried lunches.  Rajiv chuckled, shrugged 
his shoulders and told me, “Everything is experiment.”  His 
current business experiment, a small gift store in Patan, is 
faring much better.
  He proffered the same assessment of the NGO he and other 
civic-minded Dalits established during our stay in 2007. 
The ad hoc organizing committee and I had lunch the day 
we filed the papers to set up Animation Nepal and spoke of 
our hopes that it would become a conduit to economic and 
educational development for the Dalits of Jharuwarasi and 
elsewhere.  Referring to a book we were planning, I spoke of 
the several small markets I thought might be available to us 
but cautioned that we could fail as easily as succeed.  Rajiv 
intoned, “Everything is experiment.”  A simple and basic 
philosophy is summed up in that short phrase.  Upliftment 
is practical, empirical and based on trying out uncertain 
ventures.  When they fail, another attempt follows.  Plain but 
elegant, this approach is the central theme of the pursuit of 
development by this community, the right to which, as the 
next section shows, is intrinsic.
origins: Vedas or Jati Purana?
  The Sarkis of Jharuwarasi have their own version of the 
origin of their caste and of the caste system, retold by KB as 
he located his jat in the caste system and described the Sarkis’ 
fight to attain social equality.  The tale goes like this:
A mother, in the beginning, had three sons.  Kaancha Bhote thyo; 
Maila Sarki thyo; Jetho Bahun thyo. (The youngest was a Tibetan; 
the second was a Sarki; the eldest was a Brahmin).  The Bhote 
was a lama (priest), and the Sarki was a cook.  One day, a cow 
died and Maila and Kancha conspired to cook the cow and to 
feed it to their Brahmin brother.  Once the food was prepared, 
the two of them put it out for all to eat, which Maila and Kaan-
cha did.  Jetho, however, did not eat, as he was fasting that 
day.  When Maila discovered that his elder brother did not eat, 
he became furious.  He took the intestines from the cow and 
beat his elder brother with them.  The intestines wrapped over 
Jetho’s left shoulder and under his right arm and became janai 
(the sacred thread now worn by Bramins).
  This, KB claims, shows that Bahuns came upon their high 
status illegitimately.  The story reconfigures sacred time, the 
original nature of the castes, the active role of Sarkis in creating 
the caste system and the substantiation of subversive methods 
in challenging it.  The story is a dynamic between Bahuns, the 
elite of society, and others low in the caste system represented 
by the Sarki and those outside the system, represented by the 
Bhote.  At first, all are equal, different jats living together as 
brothers in the primordial family, ranked only by birth order 
(the Bahun is eldest).  The younger brothers employ trickery 
to attempt to get the eldest to break the implied taboo against 
eating beef.  The subversion fails, but only serendipitously, 
through the passivity of the Bahun, not through his intellect 
or effort for he was not even aware of his situation.  His 
intellect is trumped by that of the Sarki, whose subversion is 
validated as the original method of resistance.  It is through 
covert action, not open challenge, that his righteous attempt is 
channeled.  The ultimate result is partial, but not total failure, 
for the Bahun wears a symbol of purity composed of material 
he cannot come into contact with, thus invalidating his claim 
to his lofty and pure position.
  In addition, KB asserts that Brahmins “stole the Vedas 
from the Sarkis,” the original keepers, in which symbolic 
implements are intrinsically linked to the shoemaker’s tools 
of today.  This account provides the foundation for modern 
day caste relations, in which Brahmins dominate by forcing 
others into undesirable occupations and by refusing to eat the 
beef prescribed for Sarkis.  Keeping Dalits uneducated and 
poor, Brahmins intentionally work to oppress them and to 
thwart their efforts to uplift themselves. 
  KB does not embrace the viewpoint that Dalits help to 
oppress themselves, but claims that they lack any vehicle 
by which to change their position.  Here is where KB rightly 
detects a difference between his older generation and the 
younger generation to which Rajiv belongs.  Where Rajiv is 
more inclined to organize, lobby and advocate through group 
action, KB takes individual, subversive action to reverse the 
injustice of caste.
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Jharphuk  
  KB’s personal history is one actively confronting the 
unfairness of the caste system, but it is an individual story 
for the most part.  In it, KB recounts numerous incidents in 
which he and his family were abused by people of high castes 
and his actions to redress those wrongs.  The list of indignities 
began early in life, when after his father died, KB’s mother 
worked hard for a Bahun family pounding rice and receiving 
little in return.  She died sewing clothes for someone else’s 
family, not her own.  Later in life, KB himself worked for a 
Bahun family, earning very little.  When his infant daughter 
became ill, he asked the Bahun for a loan for a cab ride to 
see a doctor, but was refused. “He would not lend me even 
16 rupees.”  Even when she was so ill that she was “put on 
a haystack,” that Bahun was unwilling to lend him money. 
“Maybe, if we could have bought medicine or taken her to a 
hospital, she would not have died.”  KB quit working for this 
man, telling him, “I will not work for you, not even for one 
lakh [100,000] rupees per day!”
  At age 26, KB apprenticed himself to a well-known jharphuk, 
a type of faith healer, from Lele, several hours walk away. 
Deeply intelligent and socially minded, KB built fame and 
influence as a healer.  His clientele comes from near and far 
and includes people of all statuses.  Bahuns are more likely 
to consult KB than they are the Bahun  jharphuk who lives 
close by.  From this position, KB wields ominous spiritual 
power and is free to tread on caste prohibitions.  When 
offering his services KB calculates how deeply caste values 
are embodied in his high caste clients and pushes them past 
their comfort zones.  If, for example, when visiting a Bahun’s 
home to diagnose or treat an illness, KB demands entry into 
the house and if the Bahun displays too much discomfort, 
KB insists that he visit every room.  This forces the Bahun 
to purify every room rather than just one.  Similarly, KB 
often gives people water to drink in the course of a ritual 
treatment.  Again, if the Bahun is loath to take a drink from 
a Sarki’s hand, KB admonishes him to drink the entire cup, 
rather than just a sip.  Such measures provide KB avenues to 
exert his own equality, or even superiority among groups that 
would otherwise degrade him. 
  Like KB, Bika has struggled against the indignities of his 
low status to uplift his family.  He lives in West Nepal, in 
the Annapurna Conservation Area, where ethnic Gurungs 
dominate development and tourism.  He did the unheard of 
by opening a hotel, owned by a Kami and not by a Gurung, 
on a major trekking route.  Although not prohibited from 
such an endeavor by traditional caste sanctions, Bika has 
endured violence several times as a result, not from Brahmins 
but from Gurungs.  The most brutal attack was in the middle 
of the night, when perhaps a dozen masked men stabbed him 
repeatedly and wrecked the hotel’s restaurant.  He survived, 
however, rebuilding his dining hall and continuing to defy 
the oppression that others would subject him to.
  Bika’s case contrasts with KB’s, whose awesome spiritual 
power protects him from assault.  Bika’s bold business venture 
was risky because of his identity as a Dalit and because he 
lacked allies to support and protect him.  Not many have the 
courage to embark on an action that challenges the domain 
of a more powerful group, especially without supporters.  His 
hotel is distant from any Dalit community and his actions are 
similarly distant from normal Dalit actions, embarked upon 
alone.  
  More common is the subtler strategy of passive resistance.  It 
is key to coping with the burden of oppression, such as when 
a tailor in Sirubari seizes a moment of control by purposefully 
making a Brahmin patron wait a day longer than expected 
for new clothing or tacitly agrees with the Gurung leader 
who admonishes him to urge his fellow musicians to save 
the money earned from musical performances for tourists 
but later confides that he doesn’t care if tourism dries up 
because there is no benefit from it (phaida chaina).   Through 
the constant application of subtle subversive pressure, Dalits 
thread together a tapestry of resistance that can appear as 
acceptance.
  The younger generation increasingly opts for open challenge 
to the system, often emulating heroes that directly confront 
caste authority.  This is exemplified in Ram’s account of 
how he followed the alleged actions of a highly placed Dalit 
politician, who, to get his point across about rejecting the 
food sharing prohibitions, touched all the food at a banquet 
so that high caste attendees either had to go hungry or eat 
food touched by an untouchable.  Ram employed this strategy 
in an Army dining hall, where he, one of the few Dalits at 
the mess table, did the same, forcing his fellow clean-caste 
soldiers to eat defiled food.
  Ram and a small group of young people in Jharuwarasi employ 
a proactive, committee-based model of civic action borrowed 
from other groups seeking political capital, such as the 
janajatis.  Political, economic and social committees abound 
in Jharuwarasi.  They include micro-credit groups, groups that 
teach social advancement strategies, groups that educate older 
women and groups that come together to organize, fund and 
conduct community-wide projects, including the formation of 
the aforementioned Animation Nepal.  There are at least half a 
dozen organized committees and groups intended to address 
issues of development and social upliftment among the 
Sarkis and Damais of Jharuwarasi.  These include a “Father’s 
Group,” “Mother’s Group,” a chapter of the Federation for 
Dalit Women, several micro-credit groups, and Animation 
Nepal.  Except for the formal link to the Federation for Dalit 
Women, the connection between local level Dalit associations 
and ones organized at the national level is difficult to assess. 
There is a great deal of awareness of national organizations 
and it is common to hear informal discussions of the same 
issues engaged in at the national level.
  Locally-based Dalit organizations are common in some 
villages and among some Dalits and tend to be focused on local 
concerns.  For example, community-based musicians groups 
are a necessary aspect of many rural Damai communities that 
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provide traditional music for weddings.  Damai musicians in 
Sirubari are plentiful enough to have two musicians groups 
there that work on a cooperative basis.  They also have a 
“Father’s Group” as well as a “Mother’s Group,” each of which 
addresses more general community concerns, such as how 
income from tourism will be doled out.  Their neighbors, 
the Kamis, are less organized; according to Gurung contacts, 
there is no Mother’s Group among them.  Whether there are 
many organizations or not, most group action is over local 
concerns and appears not to be formally connected to national 
Dalit associations.  However, local groups do share the goal of 
advocating for Dalit rights through collective actions akin to 
classic definitions of identity politics.
identity politics 
  Identity politics can be defined as:
…demand for recognition on the basis of the very grounds on 
which recognition has previously been denied: it is qua women, 
qua blacks, qua lesbians that groups demand recognition. The 
demand is not for inclusion within the fold of “universal hu-
mankind” on the basis of shared human attributes; nor is it for 
respect “in spite of” one‘s differences. Rather, what is demanded 
is respect for oneself as different (Kruks 2001, 85).
  For Dalits, identity politics is complex and involves the 
establishment of various levels of identity, as a specific caste, 
such as Sarki, Kami or Damai, or as the shared identity of 
Dalit.  Dalit is an ambiguous identity to which not all low 
caste people aspire.  Negotiation over Dalit identity is an 
ongoing process.  In Jharuwarasi, there are frequent debates 
about whether it is good to be called “oppressed,” and there 
are those that reject being Dalit on that premise.  Counter to 
that stance is the desirability of being Dalit as it condenses 
several groups’ power into a unified identity that can bring 
much force to bear on social improvement.  At the political 
level, the meaning of Dalit for some people refers to anyone 
who is oppressed, whether by caste status, gender, economic 
status, age, disability or any other attribute that brings 
discrimination.  For Dalits who are Dalit by caste there is 
sometimes a sense of entitlement to that status and a desire 
to bar others from using the designation.  KB claimed that 
“janajatis lobbied with us to be included as Dalit, but we 
refused them,” because, in his view, Dalit is connected to 
caste.  But, whether it is better to be identified as Sarki or 
Dalit, Damai or Dalit, or to find a new identity are questions 
that are still to be resolved.  
  At the heart of the issue of Dalit identity is the entanglement of 
oppositions, i.e., the self-definition of Dalit as essentially equal 
coupled with others’ identification of Dalit as inferior.  Some 
people distance themselves from the label Dalit because of 
this entanglement   The multiple meanings of Dalit, including 
who counts as Dalit, leads to choices about pursuing social 
equality through asserting a Dalit identity with its claims 
of essentialized equality or obscuring one’s Dalit identity in 
order to access equality as a non-Dalit.   Inclusion as different 
is a tricky issue among Dalits as the utility of identity politics 
is contingent on individual and collective goals and which 
identity best serves those goals.  I now present a variety of 
uses of identity politics, actions in which Dalits engage while 
claiming caste or Dalit identity.
organizing for protest
  Organizing committees and groups is a central, collective 
strategy for fostering a better life among Dalits.  Local 
organizations consist of afno manche, an inner circle of 
associates (Bista 1990), who share common goals and 
familiarity with one another.  Such committees are organized 
for various reasons, some related to material or financial 
development and others focused more on social advancement. 
Local chapters of organizations like the Federation for Dalit 
Women (FDW) employ the Dalit label publicly and strategize 
on methods that can be used to demand recognition, in ways 
entirely consistent with Kruks’ definition of identity politics. 
Other organizations are less overt, such as Animation Nepal, 
organized by and for Dalits, but not marked as Dalit in its 
name.  Though it differs in tone and tactics from FDW, the 
intent is quite consistent as it seeks resources to improve the 
material living standards of its people.  Less focused on overt 
protest, Animation Nepal nonetheless is aimed directly at 
securing the rights that political rhetoric is meant to make 
accessible.  In a sense, the efforts of Animation Nepal pursue 
the outcome that the process of FDW is meant to produce. 
Thus, they work in concert to address different aspects of 
discrimination.
  A similar observation pertains to the existence of other 
organized groups that have deeper historical roots and less 
overtly political names, such as Fathers and Mothers Groups 
or Musicians Groups in Dalit communities.  In each of these 
cases, the groups are organized internally by Dalits and 
composed entirely of them.  Their mission is to see to various 
administrative and operation procedures that regulate 
internal relations and relations with people from other groups 
of higher status. The ones I have witnessed are comprised 
solely of one jat, such as Damais, and therefore do not pursue 
a Dalit agenda per se, but one that advocates specifically 
for their own caste.  They are generally less explicit about 
contesting hierarchy.  Their mission and actions appear to be 
less about identity politics of the same variety that the FDW 
exemplifies, but not entirely distinct from it, suggesting that 
identity politics exists in a graded fashion.
identity and religion
  An assumed attribute of Dalits, particularly when they 
were thought of as “untouchable,” was their adherence to 
Hinduism, the religion that defined their status as low.  As a 
way to separate Dalits from their justification for low status, 
Dr. Ambedkar employed the strategy of renouncing Hinduism 
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in favor of Buddhism (Jaffrelot 2004), which advocates social 
equality.  In Jharuwarasi, nine Sarki households made a 
similar shift to Christianity in an effort to distance themselves 
from the oppression of Hinduism, which sparked debate over 
the power of the different religions to advance development. 
Converted Christians claimed that Christianity was an 
avenue to success, but people who remained Hindu claimed 
that Christianity offered no such benefit.  Members of each 
religion continued to respect each other and their practices, 
sometimes grudgingly.  Here the political maneuver of 
religious conversion was not to gain equality within the 
system as it exists but to ally oneself with an alternate ethic 
that competes with the prevailing moral order.  This form of 
resistance is one of circumvention, rejecting the system while 
attempting to operate outside a rule structure one considers 
intolerable.
identity and hierarchy within dalit castes
  I asked KB one day what he predicted for the future of 
equality within the Sarki caste, an issue raised by practices 
such as religious conversion and others described below.  His 
view was subtle and complex.  KB felt that it was the duty of 
Dalits to treat each other as equals, and to change the status 
differences that stemmed from the past.  KB did not see that 
Christianity either elevated or decreased rank among Sarkis 
– they all remained Sarkis.  At the same time, KB feared that 
even within the Sarki community, mainly because of economic 
differences, Sarkis might eventually split along clan lines with 
the more affluent asserting status superiority.  He also noted 
that a number of status-based prohibitions exist between 
Sarkis and Damais in Jharuwarasi, but he felt strongly that 
these should be discontinued.  He recalled that, in the past, 
Damais were forbidden to enter Sarki houses.  But when he 
opened the first Dalit tea shop in Jharuwarasi more than two 
decades ago, after considering the issue carefully, decided to 
allow Damais into it and advocated for social equality ever 
since.  
  Status differences are visible between Dalit castes and conflict 
happens at times.  In Sirubari there was an ongoing argument 
about whether Kamis could refuse to remove Damai corpses 
to the funeral grounds, an indication that inter-Dalit caste 
relations were in flux there.  And these conflicts, the ones that 
pit the interests of one caste against another, influence some 
people to conclude that Dalit is not the identity they prefer. 
The debate over identity involves internal conflicts over the 
meaning and membership of the group as well as advocating 
for rights with social superiors.
Sanskritization
  As discussed above, the act of emulating the behaviors of 
the high caste, or sanskritization, can be viewed either as 
compliance with the system or as resistance to it.  Several 
examples of emulation are visible in Jharuwarasi, for example, 
the Dalit community is in the process of constructing two 
temples, one to Siva and the other to Ganesh.  One could 
also count the opening of tea shops about 20 years ago as 
an act of replication of a caste-based socioeconomic strategy 
employed by Bahuns and Chetris, which also provided 
Dalits the opportunity to avoid high caste tea shops and the 
discrimination to which they were subject.  The most vivid 
example of this process in Jharuwarasi, though, was when 
Sarkis decided that they would no longer eat beef, in emulation 
of other Hindu castes.  Only Sarkis ate beef according to 
tradition.  But KB and others recognize this act as one that 
is used to justify their untouchability; discontinuing beef 
consumption would remove one source of their stigmatization. 
Anyone caught eating beef was to be subject to a significant 
fine.
Anonymity
  Resistance need not always consist of collective action. 
Individuals, like Bika, the hotelier who defied the system in 
the Annapurna Conservation Area, sometimes exert their 
Dalit identity as individuals, without reference to a committee 
or group that will back them up.  This is rare.   Without a 
collective behind them, individuals put their personal safety at 
far greater risk and so find other, more subtle ways to subvert 
their status.  Through masking their identity, individuals are 
freer to act against the current of the system, but only in spaces 
where their Dalit or untouchable identity is not known.      
  This type of action, the politics of anonymity, is an adjunct 
to identity politics.  It entails cloaking one’s identity so that 
it is either ambiguous or appropriates a higher status by 
suggesting membership in a caste to which one does not, in 
fact, belong.  Identity politics operates most effectively at the 
group level, where the force of numbers makes it possible to 
contest one’s low status.  Individually, however, it is difficult to 
confront the social force behind discrimination successfully 
and the more effective strategy is often to deny or obscure 
one’s identity in favor of adopting another.  
Anonymity, familiarity and place
  Buddhanilkantha, the famous shrine of the “Sleeping Vishnu,” 
draws large crowds of worshipers regularly.  Like many other 
Hindu temples that prevent Dalits from entry (Kisan 1999), 
only “clean”caste Hindus are permitted to descend the steps 
to where Vishnu lies sleeping in a pond on a bed of snakes. 
Barring non-Hindus and Dalits is a practice taken for granted 
even in the socially progressive climate of Kathmandu Valley 
today.  However, denying entry depends on either recognizing 
the person seeking entry or on undependable visual cues like 
skin color, hair type, stature, posture, or dress, all of which 
have become less reliable over time. So, personal acquaintance 
has become essential knowledge for determining Dalit status. 
An interview with a young Damai man, Keshav, who lives near 
Buddhanilkantha, clarified the simple but effective strategy 
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of circumnavigating this prohibition.  Dalits avoid having 
Brahmins deny them entry to sacred Hindu places, preferring 
to visit temples where the priests do not know them.  When 
Keshav’s relatives visit, the Brahmin priest is unaware of their 
Dalit identity and they enter the temple freely.  Likewise, 
Keshav visits distant temples where his identity is not known, 
thus skirting the prohibition.  He asserts that this strategy is 
in fact common.
naming
  Establishing group identity, advocating its rights and 
maintaining its borders are central to the efforts of Dalit 
empowerment.  As seen above, the identity of Dalits is elevated 
via the jati purana they put forth as their origin and for why 
the struggle for equality is so intractable.  A similar story, at 
least partially grounded in fact, explicates how membership 
in each paani na chalne caste become concrete by high castes 
assigning caste name as surname.  As the discussion here will 
show, the manipulation of surnames is employed as a strategy, 
at times to assert identity and at other times to cloak it as part 
of the politics of anonymity, when an individual attempts to 
access social and economic resources.  A young Damai man 
in Jharuwarasi gave me this version of how Dalits came to 
have surnames associated with their particular jats, Sarki, 
Kami and Damai. 
Before we needed to register ourselves or to fill out governmen-
tal forms, none were called Sarki or Kami or Damai.  A man 
was simply referred to as Mohan Bahadur or Ram Bahadur.  It 
was like this for my grandfather.  When he and others went to 
a government office where a name was needed, the employee 
would ask, “What is your name?”  And he would reply, “Ram 
Bahadur.”  When asked, “What is your last name,” he would not 
know what it was and would respond again, simply with his 
name, “Ram Bahadur.”  But this would not satisfy regulations, 
so the Brahmin would ask, “What do you do?”  And he would 
say, “I sew clothing,” so the Brahmin would write his name 
down as “Damai.”  In this way, we came to have these names.
This was the predominant naming mechanism used among 
Dalits in Ghachok and Pokhara when I first conducted 
fieldwork in 1979-80 and essentially what Gray (1995) 
reports for Kathmandu Valley.  Dalit was not in current 
usage at the time and only a smattering of people used the 
surname “Nepali,” which was an attempt to mask caste 
affiliation.  In the ensuing years, the use of Sarki, Kami and 
Damai diminished in favor of Nepali as a cover, but Nepali 
quickly became associated with Dalits (it was distinct from 
the surname, Nepal, which came to be used by some higher 
caste people).  Even though one might not know which caste 
it referred to, it was certain that the bearer of it was paani 
na chalne.   Over roughly the same time frame, thar (clan) 
names emerged as another, more potent option than either 
Nepali or caste name for most people.  People once called 
Kami employed an updated version of their caste name - 
Biswokarma; Damai switched to the thar names of Pariyar or 
Das and Sarkis became identified with a variety of thars, six 
in the 42 Sarki households of Jharuwarasi alone .
  For now, this strategy successfully masks the association 
of Achami or Bogati with being Sarki.  Such masking offers 
an avenue of access that might otherwise be closed.  This is 
illustrated indirectly by my encounter with a yogi and his 
young high caste followers at Sri Santaniswor Mandir, which 
rests atop a hill adjacent to Jharuwarasi.  One day I was 
invited into the temple where the yogi was hosting about a 
dozen men, mostly young and high caste.  They drank tea, ate 
snacks, smoked marijuana and chatted.  As they prepared a 
new kettle of tea they invited me to enter.  They inquired about 
my identity and with whom I lived, as my identity would be 
related to (but not completely defined by) my hosts.  I told 
them I lived in the house of a family very near the temple 
named Bishunkhe, which none of them recognized.  They 
quizzed me on its affiliation, “Is that Bahun?  Is it Chhetri?”   I 
denied specific knowledge; they conferred among themselves 
but failed to identify its caste association.   They settled on the 
likelihood that it was Chhetri, probably because they could 
not imagine that a Westerner would live with a Dalit family. 
   Using a thar name is thus a strategy that facilitates delinking 
of personal status from caste or Dalit identity, but not totally 
or permanently.  Like the adoption of the surname Nepali, 
the use of thar names quickly enough becomes associated 
with Dalit status.  Bishwokarma is Kami and this association 
is well known.  The name Pariyar no longer obscures one’s 
identity as Damai.  Das is somewhat more effective since it is 
also used by Brahmins, but as Kisan (1999) points out, when 
a Dalit shares the thar name of a higher caste person, the Dalit 
is coerced into using his or her jat name (Sarki, Kami, Damai) 
to distinguish him or her from the latter.  In time, as the thar 
system becomes more transparent, thar names too will cease 
to distance Dalits from their caste status and other strategies 
will come to the fore.
Co-opting identity
  An alternative strategy is to appropriate names from other 
castes, and thus their caste identity, at least for specific 
purposes.  One such case of this is found in the tourist 
village of Sirubari, from which a young Damai girl has gained 
national notoriety as a pop singer.  Because her caste might 
compromise her success, she has taken a surname widely 
recognized as Chhetri.  A key to this strategy is that the 
audience has no prior knowledge of her true caste.  Essentially 
the same method is employed by some Dalits who desire 
access to prohibited ritual spaces but who shy away from 
claiming it through assertion of their identities.
ConCluSionS 
  We have arrived at a critical stage in the Dalit social movement 
of Nepal.  It has gathered momentum and employs new 
techniques to challenge discrimination.  It seeks inclusion 
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in national and local political processes, opening economic 
and educational opportunities and equalizing social status. 
The process is likely to be slow and painful since the existing 
structure of the caste system is fastened together by a dizzying 
number of beliefs and practices that cannot be addressed all 
at once and everywhere.  New generations of Dalits have now 
entered the process of advocating greater freedom, access and 
respect in public discourse.  At times their actions are well-
organized and effective, at others they are fragmented and 
their effectiveness less certain.  This paper has attempted to 
outline some of the strategies employed by Dalits to challenge, 
subvert, bend or skirt the caste system to individual and group 
ends.  In particular, it has illuminated previously overlooked 
tactics of the politics of anonymity.
  More academic attention to Dalits is needed in order to clarify 
the micro-level politics of identity and anonymity now being 
deployed by them.  Incisive research into the conditions of 
Dalit life and their efforts to improve their well-being will 
speak to important academic issues such as whether Dalits 
act to denigrate themselves.  This paper suggests that, while 
self-deprecation might occur, the greater weight of social 
action is in challenging high caste hegemony overtly and 
covertly.  Other related issues that need greater attention are 
the social and political relations between pani nachalne castes, 
paying particular attention to hierarchical relations between 
them and efforts to equalize them.  Attention to Dalit issues 
offers us the chance to understand better the caste system and 
the place of the people at the bottom of it.  It will clarify social 
and political processes of marginalized people.  More focus 
on Dalits will help to enlighten people about the conditions 
of the Dalits and bring their struggle into the light.  When 
we sort this out better, Dalits will stand to benefit by the 
efforts of academics and their chances to take a seat at the 
table set with equality, fairness and opportunity will improve 
immeasurably. 
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ENDNOTES
1. There are many definitions of Dalit in the literature and its 
utility as an identity label is hotly contested, as Mary Cameron (per-
sonal communication) observes.  Here I use it to identify a group of 
castes from the hills of Nepal, where I have conducted fieldwork, 
mainly Sarki, Kami and Damai, most, but not all of whom have 
accepted or embraced this term.  Other castes commonly included 
in this group include Gaines, Badis and others with whom I have 
not worked.
2. This review of Dalit literature is necessarily brief, but illustrates 
the general lack of attention to Dalit issues.  Vasily (2007) offers a 
more thorough listing of Dalit publications up to 2005.
3. This opinion is shared with Susan Hangen (personal commu-
nication), to whom I owe this observation.
4. The following sections are based on ethnographic observations 
made conducting research in Ghachok, Pokhara and Sirubari as 
well as during study abroad trips (including research projects) to 
Pokhara, Ghandruk and Jharwarasi.
5. Kisan (2005) provides a comprehensive list of the known sur-
names used by various castes.
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